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JUDGE-MADE ABSTENTION AND THE
FASHIONABLE ART OF "DEMOCRACY
BASHING"'
Martin H. Redish*
I. INTRODUCTION: "DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS
' 2
M ODERN PUBLIC-LAW scholars tend generally to fall into
one of two extreme camps: those who simultaneously fear and
doubt the value of judicial review in virtually all conceivable in-
stances,3 and those who either ignore or reject the fundamental
value of popular sovereignty, preferring what amounts to a Pla-
tonic government by judiciary.4 Neither extreme, however, does
justice to our unique governmental form. The former group of
scholars has effectively ignored the adjective in the phrase, "con-
stitutional democracy," while the latter group has all but ignored
the noun. It is this second group upon whom I intend to focus in
this article.'
* Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern
University; A.B., University of Pennsylvania (1967); J.D. Harvard University (1970).
1. The phrase is taken from Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at
the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV.
199 (1988).
2. The phrase is taken from R. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989).
3. See, e.g., R. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSE-
QUENCES O JUDICIAL REVIEW 2-3 (1989) (arguing "that one main enemy of the constitu-
tional order ... is the routinization of judicial power").
4. See, e.g.,. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1579-80
(1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Republican Revial] (defending republicanism, which "enthu-
siastically endorse[s] the use of constitutionalism as a check on popular majorities"). For
further discussion, see generally Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and
the Interpretive Process: An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U.L. REV. 761, 775-83
(1989) [hereinafter Redish, Federal Common Law] (critiquing the theories of "neo-repub-
lican" scholars).
5. My critique of those who urge an over-judicialization of the political process is in
no way intended to imply agreement with those who decry virtually all judicial review as
unduly anti-democratic. For my critique of the latter position, see generally Redish, Politi-
cal Consensus, Constitutional Formulae, and the Rationale for Judicial Review, 88 MICH.
L. REv. - (1990) (manuscript) [hereinafter Redish, Political Consensus] (reviewing R.
NAGEL, supra note 3).
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Political scientist Robert Dahl has written recently that
[c]ritics [of democracy] are roughly of three kinds: those funda-
mentally opposed to democracy because, like Plato, they believe
that while it may be possible it is inherently undesirable; those
fundamentally opposed to democracy because, like Robert
Michels, they believe that, while it might be desirable if it were
possible, in actuality it is inherently impossible; and those sym-
pathetic to democracy and wishing to maintain it but nonethe-
less critical of it in some important regard. The first two might
be called adversarial critics, the third sympathetic critics.'
The modern "democracy bashers"7 in the public-law area fall
largely within the first category, and thus would be classified by
Dahl as "adversarial critics." These scholars have challenged ei-
ther the values8 or the priorities9 underlying majoritarianism.
Some modern scholars, however, have fashioned dubious argu-
ments suggesting the impossibility of ever ascertaining a true
"popular will,"'10 and thus would seem to fall within Dahl's second
category.
One could reasonably debate whether the vesting in the un-
representative judiciary of almost unlimited power to hold
6. R. DAHL, supra note 2, at 2.
7. See Kelman, supra note 1.
8. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term - Foreword: The Van-
ishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REv. 43, 75 (1990) ("[M]ajority rule is not normatively
superior to other values. . . . Because majority rule is instrumental, it should not be re-
garded as superior to those values it serves."); Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J.
1493, 1498-99 (1988) (footnote omitted):
[Democracy] conjures with a term that rings of sovereign value, but too often
does so without pausing to consider what that value is. Too often, indeed, the
invocation of democracy in defense of judicial restraint signifies little more than
faute de mieux; too often, it means merely that if a determination of law can
only, at bottom, be a matter of acceding to someone's preferences, then the peo-
ple should be ruled by the sum of their own preferences . . . rather than by the
preferences of a few judges.
While Professor Michelman's description of the fundamental democratic premise is
largely accurate, his puzzling use of the word "merely" implies an unwarranted trivializa-
tion of the principle of self-rule.
9. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 74 (The "majoritarian paradigm . ...
relies upon faulty premises about the priority of democracy in the constitutional polity and
the differences among the branches of government.").
1 10. See, e.g., Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 4, at 1545-46 (footnote omit-
ted) ("[A]ccurate aggregation of preferences through politics is unlikely to be accom-
plished in light of the conundrums in developing a social welfare function. . . . In any
representative democracy, there is simply too much slippage between legislative outcomes
and constituent desires.").
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majoritarian action unconstitutional" would undermine our demo-
cratic tradition. Far more pernicious to the values of popular sov-
ereignty, however, is the view that the judiciary should - either
overtly or covertly - manipulate or ignore legislative intent on
the sub-constitutional level of statutory construction.' 2 The schol-
ars who advocate the latter view would have the courts superim-
pose on legislation social-policy choices derived through methods
external to the representational process, even when the choices ac-
tually made by the representational process do not violate the
Constitution. These scholars defend this result either by attacking
11. For the view that something approaching such power is desirable, see, e.g., Sun-
stein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1731-32 (1984)
(advocating, as a unitary theory of the Constitution, prohibition of the allocation of re-
sources and opportunites based on the exercise of raw political power, an approach that,
"in its most ambitious form, . . . would require a highly intrusive judicial role").
12. See, e.g., Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 4, at 1581-85 (defending ca-
nons of statutory construction that promote deliberation in and reduce the "pathologies"
and "malfunctions" of the legislative process, at the expense of "legislative intent in the
particular case"); cf. Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J, 1685, 1690
(1988) (suggesting that, under Sunstein's approach to statutory construction, "[t]he role of
judicial interpretation . . . seems to be a form of republican monitoring. Judicial interpre-
tation and judicial review are largely congruent if not identical. In both, courts police legis-
lative activity to avoid anti-republican results.").
In his more recent work, Sunstein - while conceding that "the statutory text is the
foundation for interpretation" - argues that "structure, purpose, intent, history, and 'rea-
sonableness' [of the legislation] all play legitimate roles." Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in
the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 503 (1989). He expressly rejects such "gen-
erally accepted understandings about statutory construction" as the postulates that "courts
must always adhere to the original meaning of the statute, or the original intent of the
enacting legislature," that "courts are or can be mere agents of the Congress," and that
"statutory meaning is equivalent to legislative intent." Id. at 412.
This is neither the time nor the place to engage in a detailed response to Sunstein's
analysis. For my critique of approaches to statutory construction that vest in the unrepre-
sentative judiciary substantial authority to ignore legislative directives under the guise of
statutory construction, see Redish, Federal Common Law, supra note 4, at 768-85. There I
argue:
[Wihen a constitutionally valid statute addresses a particular. . . matter, ... a
federal court must . . . determine the extent to which that statute actually re-
solves the issue. Situations will arise, certainly, in which a good-faith judicial
effort to determine whether - and how - a statute resolves a specific question
will be fruitless because of textual or historical ambiguity. In such an event,
judicial resolution on the basis of the court's own assessment of the competing
social and political policies will probably be unavoidable. [American] political
theory . . ., however, morally and logically dictates that judicial use of such a
practice be the last resort - after the court has done all it reasonably can to
ascertain whether the social policies and goals sought to be attained by the rep-
resentative branches through enactment of specific legislation actually dictate a
particular resolution of the question before the court.
Id. at 768-69.
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the functional capacities of the legislative process' 3 or by pointing
to flaws in the attempt to attain public will through the means of
representationalism."
Though with only limited exception' 5 they have not at-
tempted to apply their theoretical insights to either the law of fed-
eral jurisdiction in general or to the doctrine of judge-made ab-
stention in particular," the "anti-democratic" theorists provide
the only conceivably legitimate rationale for a sweeping judicial
power to second-guess and ultimately ignore constitutionally valid
policy choices of the majoritarian branches. For the doctrines of
judge-made abstention, particularly in the exercise of the federal
courts' civil rights jurisdiction, 1 effectively ignore the carefully
structured pre-existing legislative network of substantive civil,
rights statutes, jurisdictional directives, and statutorily directed
abstention. Thus, one can logically accept the abstention doctrines
only if one first accepts the premises of those scholars who place
little value on judicial adherence to majoritarian-based policy
choices.
The remainder of this Article is divided into two sections.
The first will critique the modern scholarly wave of "democracy
bashing," underscoring the inconsistency between its logical exten-
sion - the recognition of judicial power to impose judicially fash-
13. See Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1530
(1987) ("Both public choice theory and institutional process theory suggest that the legisla-
ture acting alone will be subject to. . .biases . . . .[which] may be ameliorated by treat-
ing judges as representatives charged with interpreting statutes dynamically.").
14. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
15. Recently, Professor Weinberg relied, in limited part, on some of these "anti-
democractic" theories in her attempt to justify modern judicial disregard of the Rules of
Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982). See Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw.
UL. REV. 805, 845-46 (1989) (relying on public choice theory as a basis for judicial power
to fashion federal common law); id. at 816-18 (on why the Rules of Decision Act should be
no obstacle to a legitimate federal common law); see also Redish, Federal Common Law
and American Political Theory: A Response to Professor Weinberg, 83 Nw. U.L. REv. 853
(1989) (criticizing Weinberg for dismissing the Rules of Decision Act); Weinberg, The
Curious Notion That the Rules of Decision Act Blocks Supreme Federal Common Law,
83 Nw. U.L. Rsv. 860 (1989) (responding to critique).
16. Some scholars have attempted to respond to my argument in Redish, Abstention,
Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984),
that judge-made abstention is a violation of separation of powers. See, e.g., Shapiro, Juris-
diction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 545 (1985) (arguing that I am "far too
grudging in [my] recognition of judicial discretion in matters of jurisdiction"); Wells, Why
Professor Redish is Wrong About Abstention, 19 GA. L. REv. 1097, 1099 (1985) (arguing
that abstention is legitimate as "a kind of federal common law"). No scholar, however, has
invoked civic republican or public choice analysis as part of such defense.
17. This jurisdiction is granted by 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982).
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ioned, non-constitutionally based values on constitutionally valid
legislation - and the fundamental democratic values underlying
our system.18 The second will consider and reject the alternative
arguments employed to rationalize judge-made abstention with
our basic democratic values. 19
II. IN DEFENSE OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES
There is no small degree of irony in the fact that one must
today defend basic democratic values, at the very time when much
of the world, long deprived of democracy, is demonstrating how
highly valued that form of government actually is. Those seeking
democratic rule today are, of course, not seeking rule by a group
of unaccountable Platonic judges, presumed to have a pipeline to
a "common good" derived independently of the individual choice
of the citizenry. Indeed, it is something akin to that very form of
unaccountable government, supposedly possessing independent
knowledge of the common good, that they are attempting to
terminate.
American democracy is premised on what might be called the
"representational" principle, which posits that, within constitu-
tionally established boundaries, the representative branches of
government may make policy decisions, free from judicial power
to ignore or overrule them simply on grounds of social, political or
moral disagreement. This principle flows from the fundamental
values underlying democratic systems in general and the Ameri-
can system in particular: the right of the populace to have basic
policy choices made by representatives whom it has chosen and
whom it may replace if, on balance, their policy choices do not
coincide with the wishes of a majority of the electorate. Under
this principle, the unrepresentative federal judiciary may not fash-
ion jurisdictional doctrines that ignore or undermine the policies
embodied in constitutionally valid jurisdictional statues.
To be sure, our society has on occasion chosen to prescribe
specific, substantive, normative principles of governmental behav-
ior beyond the reach of simple majoritarian processes. At least as
a general matter, however, our political theory focuses the legiti-
mation inquiry primarily on the source of a societal policy deci-
sion, rather than on what that decision ultimately is. Of course, it
18. See infra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 30-46 and accompanying text.
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may be neither feasible nor advisable to expect individuals to have
a direct say in every decision affecting their lives. But that is why
a pragmatic, large-scale democracy must emphasize the notion of
political accountability: the requirement that those who do make
policy choices periodically present themselves to the populace for
an accounting, so that the electorate may revoke their power if, on
balance, their decisions have not been consistent with the popu-
lace's wishes. This fundamental notion of modern democratic the-
ory was described by Alexander Meiklejohn, who wrote that
"[g]overnments ...derive their just powers from the consent of
the governed. If that consent be lacking, governments have no just
powers."20 It is this notion that, as a definitional matter, charac-
terizes any democratic system and distinguishes such systems
from totalitarian forms of government.
Modern American scholars, however, employ a coterie of
code words by which to attack the fundamental concept of repre-
sentative government: "Public choice,"'" "civic" or "liberal" re-
publicanism,22 and "practical reason ' ' 3 are the most commonly
employed. To be sure, these scholars often contend that they are
merely attempting to return to the true democratic ideal, rather
than abandon it.24 They argue that powerful private interests too
often gain control of the legislative process, 25 and, as a result, leg-
20. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 9 (1960).
21. E.g., Eskridge, Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice The-
oryfor Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 276 (1988) [hereinafter Eskridge,
Politics Without Romance] ("Public choice theory ... analyzes the political process using
principles of economics ....").
22. E.g., Michelman, supra note 8, at 1494 ("the civic-republican strain in political
thought"); Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 4, at 1541 ("[I]iberal republican-
ism"); see infra note 27.
23. E.g., Farber & Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA
L. REV. 1615, 1616 (1987); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 29, 32 (1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups]; see infra note 27.
24. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 8, at 1495 (arguing that political freedom is
enhanced by republicanism); Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 23, at 29 (arguing that
the existing legislative process "allows powerful private organizations to block necessary
government action" and that "the lawmaking process has been transformed into a series of
accommodations among competing elites"). Professor Sunstein, however, fails to explain
exactly how one is to determine that specific government actions are "necessary."
25. Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 23, at 29. But see Posner, Economics,
Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 272
(1982) (arguing that "[c]ourts do not have the research tools that they would need to
discover the motives behind legislation. Nor can they just presume the presence of an inter-
est group somewhere behind the scenes.").
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islation rarely reflects the true will of the electorate.26 But while
this may no doubt be true to a certain extent, it hardly makes
sense to remedy the problem by putting a veto power in the hands
of the federal judiciary - the only branch neither representative
nor accountable in any meaningful respect. At the very least, a
public truly unhappy with the decisions of its elected representa-
tives has the power to vote them out of office, regardless of the
resources or influence of the relevant private interest groups. The
same, of course, cannot be said of the federal bench.
The clearest indication that many modern scholars are de-
parting from the fundamental democratic norm comes in their
suggestion that there exists one clearly defined "common good"27
- presumably as they define it - and that there are normatively
and socially "right" answers to many questions facing society.,,
26. See, e.g., Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. Rav. 223, 223 (1986) ("Too often
the [legislative] process seems to serve only the purely private interests of special interest
groups at the expense of the broader public interests it was ostensibly designed to serve.");
see also Eskridge, Politics Without Romance, supra note 21, at 277 ("Public choice theory
indicates that the legislature will produce too few laws that serve truly public ends, and too
many laws that serve private ends.").
27. See, e.g., Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 23, at 31-32:
The republican conception . . . assumes that through discussion people can, in
their capacities as citizens, escape private interests and engage in pursuit of the
public good. . . . [T]his conception reflects a belief that debate and discussion
help to reveal that some values are superior to others. Denying that decisions
about values are merely matters of taste, the republican view assumes that
"practical reason" can be used to settle social issues.
28. For the view that "the common good" is not so easy to ascertain, see, e.g., R.
DAHL, supra note 2, at 303. (Dahl argues that "in a pluralistic country with even a moder-
ately complex society, that is, in any modern democratic country, it is difficult to specify
'the common good' precisely enough to guide collective decisions. All three terms - 'the,'
'common,' and 'good' - are problematical, to say the least." Id.
Dahl further contends:
While general principles of distributive justice and common good need not
be completely irrelevant, they cannot contribute much as constitutional (or con-
stitutive) principles for a political order, particularly a large and complex or-
der. . . .Civic dialogue is not a discussion among professional philosophers at-
tentive to the fine points of an abstract and tightly reasoned argument. In civic
discussion, precise principles from which conclusions may be rigorously drawn
are far less important than the normative orientations embedded in the culture,
which may be local and parochial, national, or transnational. These normative
orientations themselves are usually rather open-ended. . ..
The search for rationally justified moral criteria for determining justice or
the general good, which has been so ardently pursued by so many moral philoso-
phers, is likely to remain, for the most part, an intellectual exercise performed
by and for a small group of intellectuals . . ..
Id. at 305-06.
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By investing the unrepresentative judiciary with the authority to
determine these "right" answers, however, these scholars would
effectively establish jurists as the equivalent of Platonic-philoso-
pher kings in total derogation of the process values of self-deter-
mination and popular sovereignty that are so central to the notion
of democratic government.
The underlying normative assumptions of democracy's critics
appear to be that there is no preeminent value in the principles of
self-determination and political accountability and that one may
instead derive "right" answers to non-constitutionally based29 pol-
icy issues by means other than the choices of the representatives
of the electorate. If one accepts these premises, the value of de-
mocracy naturally vanishes. I do not believe, however, that our
system has in fact made such a value choice. Thus, unless and
until we abandon the fundamental notion of rule by the people -
and to do so would surely represent a departure from current
world trends - we must reject the notion that there exist either a
provable "common good" apart from the will of the people or
truly "right" answers to social issues (at least when not based on a
specific value derived from the Constitution) which may be im-
posed on the public.
III. VIEWING THE ABSTENTION DOCTRINES FROM THE
PERSPECTIVE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY
The most amazing aspect of judge-made abstention is that its
leading judicial advocates"0 are those most closely associated with
the theory of judicial restraint."' Of course, in one sense, absten-
Similarly, for a description of the modern theory of "adversary democracy," which rejects
the notion of a coherent concept of the "common good," see J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND
ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 17 (1983).
29. It is true, of course, that in a constitutional democracy specific moral choices
have been removed from simple majoritarian control. See generally Redish, Federal Com-
mon Law, supra note 4 (arguing that all governmental policy decisions, except those pre-
scribed by the Constitution, should be judged by how consistent they are with the principle
of self-determination). Because, however, no one has ever contended that the abstention
doctrines are in any sense constitutionally compelled, that point is irrelevant for present
purposes. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
30. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Ohio Civil
Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986), expanded the
Younger abstention doctrine when he held that the district court should have abstained
from exercising jurisdiction over a suit to enjoin a state administrative proceeding. See M.
REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 372-
73 (2d ed. 1990).
31. See, e.g., Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REv. 693
1030 [Vol. 40:1023
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tion can be characterized as a form of "judicial restraint," be-
cause as a result of the doctrines' invocation the federal courts
choose not to act. But such a characterization of the concept is far
too narrow, because it fails to include the well-established princi-
ple that a judicial refusal to act, in the face of a constitutionally
valid legislative directive to the contrary, constitutes the effective
exercise of a judicial veto power over legislative action. 2 As such,
it actually represents the height of undue judicial activism and
therefore has no place in a democratic society. I
It is difficult for me to comprehend how scholars could realis-
tically suggest that recognition of the obligation to act when so
directed by the legislature, that is, of what is really a form of
judicial humility in the face of legislative directive, would some-
how undermine the judiciary's performance of its vital counter-
majoritarian checking function.3" I have consistently urged recog-
nition of such judicial authority as a central tenet of American
political theory.34 But performance of such a function is both logi-
cally and practically irrelevant to issues that do not even arguably
raise constitutional questions. In the highly unlikely event that the
Supreme Court believes that the congressional vesting of jurisdic-
tion in the federal courts to enforce the civil rights laws violates
the Constitution, it should say so. Short of such a finding, how-
ever, the Court lacks the legitimate authority by which to ignore
or overrule policy choices made by the representative branches of
government.
One might reasonably ask whether there exist any legitimate
justifications for judge-made abstention that are consistent - or
at least reconcilable - with basic notions of democratic theory.
The answer, quite simply, is "No." Congress' substantive civil
(1976) (attacking the view that federal judges have any role to play in solving a social
problem when the federal Constitution and statutes, expressing popular will, have not ad-
dressed the particular problem).
32. Cf. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (holding that the state courts have no
authority to decline to enforce a federal statute over which they have jurisdiction).
33. See, e.g., Beermann, "Bad" Judicial Activism and Liberal Federal-Courts Doc-
trine: A Comment on Professor Doernberg and Professor Redish, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1053, 1069 (1989-90) ("Although on the surface limitations on jurisdiction might not ap-
pear to be consistent with expanding counter-majoritarian rights, reasons of political capi-
tal . . . and legal consciousness . . . indicate that the limitations might serve the cause of
protecting rights.").
34. See, e.g., Redish, Political Consensus, supra note 5; Redish, The Passive Vir-
tues, the Counter-Majoritarian Principle, and the "Judicial-Political" Model of Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 22 CONN. L. REv. - (1990) (manuscript).
10311989-901
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rights legislation vests in the individual statutory protection of his
federal rights.3 5 Moreover, by statutory grant of jurisdiction, Con-
gress has directed the federal courts to enforce those substantive
protections,36 in large part because of congressional mistrust of
state-court willingness to protect those rights. 7 Finally, Congress
has established an intricate network of statutorily dictated federal
judicial abstention in specific areas where Congress has decided it
to be appropriate. 8 Yet without even purporting to rely on legisla-
tive text, policy, or history, the Supreme Court has chosen to fash-
ion its own criteria for abstention, going well beyond anything al-
ready authorized by Congress, on grounds that directly contradict
the policy decisions underlying the legislation in the first place.3 9
This is judicial usurpation at its most indefensible extreme.
One could, I suppose, fashion an argument that such judicial
action is not explicitly inconsistent with legislative directive, be-
cause nothing in the text of the civil rights statutes expressly pro-
hibits the federal courts from abstaining in the exercise of their
jurisdiction. But such an argument would represent the height of
interpretational disingenuousness. In the specific instances in
which Congress desired that the federal courts abstain, it so pro-
vided by statute.40 One could hardly expect Congress to insert in
35. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured ....
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (1982).
37. See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 240 (1972) ("Proponents of the leg-
islation noted that state courts were being used to harass and injure individuals, either
because the state courts were powerless to stop deprivations or were in league with those
who were bent upon abrogation of federally protected rights.").
38. See Anti-Injunction Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982) (providing, with three ex-
ceptions, that federal courts may not enjoin state-court proceedings); Tax Injunction Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) (prohibiting, in most circumstances, federal district court inter-
ference with state tax collection); Johnson Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982) (prohibiting,
under specified circumstances, federal district court interference with state orders affecting
public utility rates).
39. Judge-made abstention is premised on the desire to avoid the "unseemly failure
to give effect to the principle that state courts have the solemn responsibility, equally with
the federal courts 'to guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the
Constitution of the United States .... ' " Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460-61
(1974). Yet as Mitchum recognized, fear and mistrust of state courts gave rise to the
congressional provision of federal jurisdiction to enforce civil rights in the first place. See
supra note 37.
40. See supra note 38.
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each civil rights statute a provision directing the federal courts
"not to ignore, circumvent, or overrule this statute, short of a find-
ing of unconstitutionality." The statutory text creates a substan-
tive right and directs the federal courts to be open to those seeking
redress for violation of that right. Other than by addition of the
now-popular directive, "Read our lips," it is difficult to see how
Congress could have made its goal clearer.
Another argument sometimes employed to rationalize the ju-
dicial authority to ignore legislative directives is the view that the
judicial-legislative relationship is a form of joint "partnership."
According to this view, Congress implicitly delegates to the courts
authority to "modify" legislation when they deem necessary.41
There have, to be sure, been instances of such delegated law-mak-
ing power.42 But one cannot reasonably assume the existence of
such judicial authority as a per se matter. When Congress desires
to delegate lawmaking to the courts, it usually employs broad stat-
utory terminology capable of numerous equally legitimate con-
structions. I cannot believe, however, that one could reasonably
rely on the "partnership" logic to authorize the federal courts to
repeal Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 43 or section 1 of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act,44 for example - at least if the values of
representationalism and political accountability retain any force at
all.45
CONCLUSION
It might be suggested that my reliance on neutral principles
of democratic theory as a basis for criticizing judge-made absten-
tion conveniently reaches a result that happens to be consistent
with my own view of the merits of the issue. It would be impossi-
ble to deny the factual accuracy of such a suggestion, in the pre-
sent context.46 However, I have elsewhere applied the principles of
democratic theory and interpretive analysis described here to at-
41. See, e.g., Althouse, The Humble and the Treasonous: Judge-Made Jurisdiction
Law, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1035, 1048-49 (1989-90).
42. A classic example is section 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § l
(1988). See, e.g., P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, 2 ANTITRUST LAW 310a (1978) (on the
Court's habit of interpreting the Sherman Act broadly).
43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1982).
44. 15 U.S.C. § (1988).
45. See supra text accompanying note 20.
46. For my critique of the abstention doctrines on policy grounds, see M. REDISH,
supra note 30, at 281-308, 337-73.
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tack such pro-federal jurisdictional doctrines as the creation of
federal common law,4 1 the recognition of section 198348 as an "ex-
pressly authorized" exception to the Anti-Injunction Statute,49
and the recognition of Supreme Court power to review non-final
appeals from state courts." The point, in other words, is that a
democratic system cannot function if the majoritarian branches
are allowed to reach only those constitutionally valid results that
some external source finds pleasing. This fundamental notion of
American democratic theory applies as much to the law of federal
jurisdiction as to any area of statutory construction.
47. See Redish, Federal Common Law, supra note 4.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
49. See Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute Reconsidered, 44 U. CHi. L. REV. 717,
733-39 (1977).
50. See M. REDISH, supra note 30, at 254-60 (critique of Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), which recognized exceptions to the final-judgment rule of 28
U.S.C. § 1257 (1988)).
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